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Re-conceptualizing equality in the work place: a reading of the latest CJEU’s opinions 




This article analyses the definition of religion adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
in its latest opinions concerning the wearing of the headscarf in the workplace. It argues that, by 
adopting a secular/liberal definition of religion and linking religious freedom to individual autonomy, 
the CJEU creates a fixed legal and religious subject who is free and at the same time compelled to 
experience religion in a particular way. This, in turn, has two important implications: first, it creates a 
problem of equality as it distinguishes between different equality grounds. Second, contrary to liberal 
claims to secure the plurality and respect of religious minorities, it opens the door to the exclusion of 
veiled Muslim women from the European labour market. 
Keywords: headscarf in the workplace, religious and secular, equality, religious freedom 
 
1. Introduction 
The right to religious freedom, enshrined in the law and codified in national constitutions as well as in 
international treaties, is considered one of the most important achievements of secular/western/liberal 
democracies which should guarantee the free expression of religious difference and the peaceful 
coexistence of different religions. However, in recent years, the visibility of religious difference in 
secular/liberal Europe has been at the centre of many polemical debates concerning notions of 
democracy, secularism and freedom. This is clear in the case of Muslim religious symbols such as the 
female veil, which has been widely legally regulated in the public sphere: as a result, Muslim 
women’s freedom has been severely limited, to the point that veiled women have been forbidden to 
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study, to stand in a court room, and even to walk in public. Many cases have been decided at the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which has usually upheld national decisions over the 
visibility of the practice, leaving member states a wide discretion in deciding whether the 
manifestation of religious symbols in the public sphere is necessary to protect the rights and freedom 
of others, public order, and democratic values. 
While the wearing of the veil has been widely debated at the ECtHR, only recently has it been 
discussed at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) which was called to give an opinion 
on two cases1 regarding the application of EU Directive 2000/78 concerning the establishment of a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation. The CJEU’s decisions have 
sparked a passionate debate in Europe for two main reasons: firstly, they concern the principle of non-
discrimination in relation to the practice of veiling in the workplace, touching upon other important 
individual rights. Secondly, they have altered the complex balance between a company’s private 
interests and individual rights, opening the door to the exclusion of many Muslim women from the 
European labour market. 
In analysing the latest CJEU decisions, most scholars have focused on the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination in the workplace enshrined in Directive 2000/78. These studies, however, do not 
problematize the secular forms of power that have led to the exclusion of veiled Muslim women from 
the labour market. In other words, by focusing mainly on the principle of non-discrimination as 
neutral and gender-blind, scholarly analysis lacks a theoretical understanding of the implications of 
secular values in European and human rights law. This article addresses and explores this neglected 
issue in relation to the CJEU’s rulings on the interpretation of Directive 2000/78 concerning the 
wearing of the headscarf in the workplace. It argues that by adopting a secular/liberal definition of 
religion and religious practices and by linking religious freedom to individual autonomy, the CJEU 
                                                          
1 Case C-157/15 Achbita, Centrum voor geliijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure [2017] 
EU:C:203; Case C-188/15 Bougnaoui and Association de defense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v Micropole 




creates a fixed legal and religious subject, a generic gender-neutral homo religiosus who is both free 
and at the same time compelled to experience religion in a particular way. This, in turn, has important 
implications when applied to Directive 2000/78. Firstly, it creates a problem in the area of equality as 
it inevitably distinguishes between different equality grounds, between different religions, and 
between believers and non-believers. Secondly, contrary to liberal claims to secure the plurality and 
respect of religious minorities, it opens the door to the exclusion of veiled Muslim women from the 
European labour market. In this sense, liberal secularism does not emerge as the mere separation of 
private and public, church and state, but as the re-configuration of religious practices and sensitivities 
in the secular private and public spheres. In other words, by defining the proper way to understand 
religion and the religious subject, secularism creates the problem of religious minorities instead of 
solving it.2 
As I shall argue, although the CJEU seems to contradict previous legal decisions taken by the ECtHR 
concerning the wearing of the veil in the workplace,3 it actually adopts the western/secular and 
gender-blind definition of religion which is based on the binary distinction between forum internum 
and forum externum, faith and its manifestation, public and private. A close analysis of the CJEU’s 
decisions over the practice of veiling reveals that religion, unlike sex, ethnicity, and skin colour, 
which are ‘visible’ differences, is seen as a private matter, something that can be chosen, hidden, or 
separated from the subject. The CJEU draws from a western Protestant view of religion as a personal 
and private relationship between God and the individual, neglecting not only different ways of 
experiencing religion, but also the complex interrelation between religion and gender. 
I argue that, by defining religion as something private, the CJEU also defines the subject to be 
protected: a gender-neutral homo religiosus who is able to separate its internal from its external self, 
as revealed in the distinction made by article 9 (‘Freedom of religion’) of the European Convention of 
                                                          
2 Saba Mahmood, Religious difference in a secular age: A minority report (Princeton University Press 2015). 





Human Rights between faith and its manifestation. The separation between forum internum and forum 
externum encoded in the law shows that article 9 does not protect all religious individuals, just those 
who are able to (autonomously) hold a belief and to express this belief in a specific way. The CJEU’s 
individualistic approach, mirrored in the distinction made by article 9 between faith and its 
manifestation, leads to a further paradox of European law, namely, the equality between religious and 
non-religious worldviews: the application of different equality grounds in the area of employment 
leads, in turn, to a re-conceptualization of the notion of equality. This re-conceptualization has been 
applied by widening the application of article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFREU) concerning the rights of employers to conduct a business; in the case, the 
CJEU ruled in favour of greatly limiting individual rights, without balancing employees’ and 
employers’ rights. By so doing, it opens the door to the exclusion of veiled Muslim women from the 
European labour market. This exclusion, I argue, depends upon a prior (western/secular) normative 
understanding of what religion is and how the ‘modern’ legal and religious subject should experience 
its religious life. The imposition of a specific form of subjectivity reveals that secularism, which has 
become synonymous with neutrality and modernity, articulates and defines specific forms of 
knowledge and emerges not as the mere separation between the private and the public, but as the re-
configuration of religious sensitivities and religious practices in the secular space.4 This re-
configuration, however, shows all the paradoxes of secular/liberal law which, contrary to its 
foundational principles, on the one hand claims to safeguard minorities’ rights while on the other it 
compels the subject to assimilate to the majority. 
2. Blurring the line between direct and indirect discrimination: the Achbita and Bouganoui 
cases 
Two recent CJEU opinions concerning the application of EU Directive 2000/78 on non-discrimination 
in the workplace regarding freedom of religion have sparked a passionate debate in Europe: Achbita 
                                                          
4 Sab Mahmood ‘Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable Divide?’ in Talal Asad, Wendy 
Brown, Judith Butler, Saba Mahmood (eds) Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech 
(University of California Press 2009). 
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and Bouganoui (2017).5 In both cases, the CJEU has given great emphasis to Article 16 of the 
CFREU (‘Freedom to conduct a business’), focusing on the possible existence of justifications for a 
direct or indirect discriminatory ban of religious symbols. 
Ms Achbita had been employed on a permanent contract by G4S, a private company that provides 
reception services for customers in the private and public sectors. When she joined the company, an 
unwritten rule required employees not to wear visible signs of their political, philosophical or 
religious beliefs in the workplace. In April 2006, however, Ms Achbita informed G4S that she 
intended to wear an Islamic headscarf: despite the lack of a written rule in the company’s policy, G4S 
forbade the claimant to wear the veil, asserting the importance of the company’s image of neutrality. 
Ms. Achbita, unhappy with the company’s prohibition, officially notified G4S of her intention to wear 
an Islamic veil at work on the 12th of May 2006. After a couple of weeks, G4S’s board approved an 
amendment to the workplace regulations, adding that employees could not wear any political, 
philosophical or religious symbol. One day before the regulation came into force, on the 12th of June 
2006, Ms Achbita was dismissed for not complying with the company’s internal rules. She sued a 
claim to the Labour Court, in Belgium, for discrimination, as G4S has modified the company’s 
regulation after her notification. The Labour Court, however, dismissed her claim, stating that G4S’s 
new regulations did not amount to direct or indirect discrimination, nor to an infringement of her 
individual right of freedom of religion. Ms Achbita appealed to the Court of Cassation, which referred 
the following question to the CJEU: 
“Should article 2 (2) (a) of Directive 2000/78 be interpreted as meaning that the prohibition on 
wearing, as a female Muslim, a headscarf at the workplace does not constitute direct discrimination 
where the employer’s rule prohibits all employees from wearing outward signs of political, 
philosophical and religious beliefs at the workplace?”.6 
                                                          
5 Achbita and Bougnoui (n. 1). 
6 Achbita, (n. 1) para 21. 
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The CJEU gave a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Council Directive 2000/78, 
which establishes a general framework for the equal treatment of employees “for combating 
discrimination on the ground of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards 
employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the member states the principle of 
equal treatment”.7 The Court focused on the interpretation of article 2 (2) of the Directive which 
provides that 
“a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than 
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to 
article 1; b) indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, 
criterion or practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a 
particular age, or a particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other 
persons unless:…that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimated aim and 
the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.”8 
Drawing on article 2 (2) (a) of the Directive, the CJEU established that Ms Achbita was not the victim 
of direct discrimination, as the company’s written rule requiring her not to wear any political, 
philosophical, or religious symbols applied to all employees, and not only to the claimant’s garments.9 
Hence, while the Court recognized that the right of freedom of religion also includes the right to 
manifest a religious belief, it distinguished between situations in which a company imposes 
limitations on all its employees and the ones that target a particular religion, which would lead to a 
specific group of people receiving less favourable treatment. On the facts, since the regulation applied 
to all employees, the Court found that Ms Achbita was not a victim of direct discrimination based on 
her religious beliefs. It seems therefore that the Court did not consider the fact that the introduction of 
                                                          
7 ‘Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation’, Official Journal L 303 , 02/12/2000 P. 0016 – 0022, Art. 1, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:en:HTML 
8 Italics added. 
9 Achbita, (n. 1) Opinion of AG Kokott, para 48. 
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a regulation that prohibits the wearing of religious, political or philosophical symbols in the 
workplace came just after the claimant had notified G4S of her intention to wear an Islamic headscarf. 
After establishing that Ms. Achbita had not been a victim of direct discrimination, the Court examined 
whether, based on Article 2 (2) (b) of Directive 2000/78, the claimant was a victim of indirect 
discrimination, as the company’s rules could affect a specific group of believers (in this case ‘female 
employees of Muslim faith’).10 However, due to the difficulty of establishing whether the claimant 
had been a victim of indirect discrimination, the CJEU left to the Belgian national courts the duty of 
determining whether the internal rule of a private company could cause a disadvantage to a person 
who carries a particular religious belief and whether discriminatory provisions could be justified by a 
legitimate aim. In essence, in the Achbita case, the CJEU has provided an elaboration on how to 
interpret the concept of indirect discrimination, but it has given a great flexibility to national courts on 
the application of the EU Directive. The CJEU concluded that even if indirect discrimination was 
established, it could be justified in light of Article 16 of the CFREU on ‘freedom to conduct a 
business’:11 “an employer’s wish to project an image of neutrality towards customers […] is, in 
principle, legitimate, notably where the employer involves in its pursuit of that aim only those 
workers who are required to come into contact with the employer’s customers”.12 Hence, the CJEU 
accepted that prohibiting any religious, political or philosophical symbol was a legitimate aim for a 
company pursuing a policy of neutrality, given that the “policy is genuinely pursued in a consistent 
and systematic manner”13 towards every employee. Thus, instead of considering whether Ms Achbita 
was a victim of indirect discrimination based on the fact that the company’s policies had “put persons 
having a particular religious belief […] at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons”,14 
the CJEU considered whether G4S’s dress policy was appropriate and necessary to achieve the aim 
pursued15 through an examination of the nature of Ms Achbita’s work. The Court pointed out that the 
                                                          
10 Achbita, (n. 1) para 57. 
11 Ibid, Opinion of AG Kokott, para 81. 
12 Achbita, (n. 1) para 38. 
13 Ibid, para 40. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, para 42. 
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claimant’s dismissal was justified to achieve a legitimate aim, as the nature of her work implied direct 
contact with the public and G4S wanted to give an image of neutrality. In contrast with previous legal 
decisions,16 the Court adopted a narrow view of the concept of necessity as the company’s internal 
rules were not limited to ‘workers who interact with customers’. Only at the end of the judgement did 
the Court refer to the possibility that G4S could accommodate the requirements of Ms Achbita by 
transferring her to a role that did not entail a relationship with customers and/or that the company’s 
regulations could be applied only to employees that dealt directly with customers. Hence, while on the 
one hand the Court referred to art. 5 of the Directive 2000/78 which states that a reasonable 
accommodation can be achieved through mitigating policies that remove obstacles for the claimant’s 
participation in employment, on the other it gave Belgian national courts the discretion to define 
whether G4S had violated the claimant’s individual rights and/or whether the company was able to 
accommodate Ms Achbita’s claim. 
 
In the same year, 2017, the CJEU was called to express another opinion concerning the wearing of the 
veil in the workplace. In the case Bougnaoui v Micropole17 the claimant, Ms Bougnaoui, met a 
representative of Micropole at a student fair in 2007 and in 2008 she started an internship in the 
company. During the internship she was wearing a bandana as Micropole informed her that the 
wearing of an Islamic headscarf might pose problems when dealing with customers. This, however, 
did not stop the company employing Ms Bougnaoui on a permanent contract. Almost one year later, 
on the 15th of May 2009, a customer complained that Ms Bougnaoui’s headscarf had upset a number 
of his employees and asked Micropole to send someone without a veil, stating, ‘No veil next time!’ 
Immediately afterwards, in June 2009, Micropole asked Ms Bougnaoui to remove the veil but she 
refused, alleging that her garments did not interfere with her performance at work. As a result, Ms 
Bougnaoui was dismissed with a letter which stated, inter alia, that since the dismissal was to be 
                                                          
16 In the CHEZ Case, which concerned discrimination based on ethnic origins, the CJEU stated that in cases of 
indirect discrimination it is not enough that the measures adopted are justified by a necessary mean to achieve 
an appropriate aim. Case C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia 
[2015] EU:C:480. 
17 Bougnaoui (n. 1). 
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attributed to her refusal to remove the veil, the company was entitled not to give her a notice period in 
which she would be remunerated. Ms Bougnaoui considered the dismissal an act of discrimination 
and sued Micropole. While the Labour Tribunal of Paris ordered Micropole to pay compensation to 
the claimant for the notice period, French judges established that Ms Bougnaoui was not a victim of 
discrimination as Micropole’s aim to protect its image of neutrality was proportionate and necessary. 
Ms Bougnaoui, assisted by the association de défense des droits de l'homme (ADDH), an association 
supporting the individual’s fundamental rights, appealed against the decision to the Court of Appeal 
of Paris, which upheld the ruling of the Labour Tribunal, adding that the claimant was imposing her 
religious beliefs on Micropole’s customers without considering their feelings. Ms Bougnaoui 
appealed at the Court of Cassation, which referred the following question to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling: 
 
“Must article 4 (1) of Directive 2000/78 be interpreted as meaning that the wish of a customer of an 
information technology consulting company no longer to have the information technology services of 
that company provided by an employee, a design engineer, wearing an Islamic headscarf, is a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement, by reason of the nature of the particular occupational 
activities concerned or of the context in which that are carried out?”18 
The CJEU found that Ms Bougnaoui had worn the veil for years before the customer’s complaint; that 
there were no written or unwritten company rules; and that the customer’s objection could be 
understood as pointing directly to female Muslim religious symbols (‘No veil next time!’) and not to 
religious or political symbols in a general sense. Therefore, the CJEU established that Ms Bougnaoui 
was a victim of direct discrimination and tried to understand whether the employer could rely upon 
the exceptions made by article 4 (1) to justify her dismissal, focusing on the definition of 
‘occupational requirement’. Based on the CJEU, an ‘occupational requirement’ is one that “is 
objectively dictated by the nature of the occupational activities concerned or of the context in which 
they are carried out. It cannot, however, cover subjective considerations, such as the willingness of the 
                                                          
18 Ibid, para 26. 
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employer to take account of the particular wishes of the customer”.19 Hence, the exceptions to 
‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’ could not be applied based on the preference of 
one customer, although “what is proportionate may vary depending on the size of the undertaking 
concerned. The bigger the business, the more likely it will be to have resources allowing it to be 
flexible in terms of allocating its employees to the tasks required of them. Thus, an employer in a 
large undertaking can be expected to take greater steps to make a reasonable accommodation with his 
workforce than an employer in a small- or medium-sized one”.20 In line with this reasoning and 
drawing on the Feryn case,21 in which an employer was accused of direct discrimination because he 
did not employ ‘immigrants’ based on his customers’ preferences, the CJEU concluded that 
“Article 4(1) of Council Directive 2000/78/EC […] must be interpreted as meaning that the 
willingness of an employer to take into account the wishes of a customer no longer to have the 
services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be considered a 
genuine and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of that provision”.22 
Through this reasoning, the CJEU avoided considering whether the claimant had been subjected to 
different treatment based on specific religious beliefs, preferring to focus on the ‘occupational 
requirement’ and the fact that Micropole did not have a written policy that forbade the manifestation 
of political, philosophical or religious beliefs. 
Although the Achbita and Bougnaoui opinions had different outcomes, what is of particular interest is 
the great importance given to Article 16 of the CFREU at the expense of the claimants’ individual 
rights. Those opinions also reveal an intrinsic contradiction: in the Achbita case, it is difficult to 
understand how the wearing of a Muslim veil could undermine the image of the company’s neutrality. 
G4S, with its new dress policy, had anticipated a possible problem with customers who might feel 
offended by the manifestation of (Muslim) religious beliefs. On the other hand, Micropole seems to 
                                                          
19 Ibid, para 40. 
20 ibid, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 125. 
21 C- 54-07 Feryn v Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding [2008]. 
22 ibid, para 42. 
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have been more open to religious differences as it dismissed Ms Bougnaoui only when there was an 
objective problem with a customer, although it clearly amounts to direct discrimination. Henceforth, 
while customers’ preferences would amount to direct discrimination under article 4 (1), they could be 
justified as indirect discrimination under article 2 (2) (b). Although the cases were decided by 
focusing on different articles of Directive 2000/78, they mirror a general European trend that 
privileges leaving a large degree of discretion to national courts in relation to the manifestation of 
religious symbols. The risk is that these decisions will open the door for private companies to 
introduce dress code regulation in mass, implicitly discriminating against certain religions for whom 
the wearing of religious symbols is an integral part of the individual. 
 
3. (Re) defining religious diversity 
Based on various EU Treaties, the CJEU abides by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights (along with the ECtHR’s decisions) and 
a wide range of EU laws that go beyond human rights issues as the final authority of EU legislation. 
Article 1 of Directive 2000/78 does not include a definition of religion: however, the CJEU has 
adopted the definition of religion enclosed in article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and article 10 (1) of the CFREU.23 In both articles the term religion includes freedom of belief and 
freedom to manifest one’s belief: hence, the reference to freedom of religion in article 1 of Directive 
2000/78 covers both the forum internum and the forum externum. In fact, according to the ECtHR, 
religious freedom is not limited to belief but extends to its manifestations and is “one of the 
foundations of a democratic society”.24 Article 9 (1) of the Convention provides that 
                                                          
23 Achbita, (n. 1), para 49. 
24 Kokkinakis v. Greece [1993] ECHR App. no. 14307/88. para 31. 
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“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”. 
However, not every act based on religious belief is protected by article 9: in the ECtHR’s decisions, 
the term practice enclosed in the article “does not cover each act which is motivated or influenced by 
a religion or belief” but only a “normal and recognized manifestation” of religion or belief that 
“actually express[es] the belief concerned”.25 For this reason, article 9 (2) includes certain limitations 
to the manifestation of religious beliefs, providing that 
 “[the] freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. 
Thus, although the ECtHR has never clearly defined religion,26 leaving this duty to European member 
states, Article 9 clearly establishes a distinction between the right to hold a belief and the right to 
manifest a belief, forum internum and forum externum; whereas the first is protected by the law, the 
latter is subject to limitations. The distinction between ‘belief’ and ‘manifestation’ made by Article 9, 
which mirrors the secular division between public and private, has received little attention from 
jurists, as it is taken as necessary in the legal reasoning.27 The idea that religion necessitates a 
separation between what is observable and what does not fit with the liberal separation between the 
public and the private divide is an important feature of the ECtHR and CJEU rulings over the practice 
of veiling. 
The distinction between forum internum and forum externum enshrined in Article 9, however, encodes 
problematic assumptions about religion and religious practices as well as the role of the law in 
regulating religious symbols in the public and private spheres, as it discloses a specific secular 
                                                          
25 Arrowsmith v the United Kingdom [1978] ECHR App. n. 7050/75, 19-20. 
26 Carolyn Evans,  Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights, (Vol. 1 Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
27 Peter Cumper & Tom Lewis ''Taking Religion Seriously"? Human Rights and Hijab in Europe—Some 
Problems of Adjudication' [2008] Journal of Law and Religion. 24 599. 
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definition of religion. In fact, “religion in modernity indicates a universal genus of which the various 
religions are species: each religion comes to be demarcated by a system of propositions; religion is 
identified with an essentially interior, private impulse; and religion comes to be seen as essentially 
distinct from secular pursuits such as politics, economics, and the like”.28 Likewise, the distinction 
between forum internum and forum externum made by Article 9 presupposes a religious individual 
whose faith is a simple private matter, distinguishable from its manifestations (such as symbols, 
rituals, etc.). In other words, “a secular person is someone whose affective-gestural repertoires express 
a negative relation to forms of embodiment historically associated with (but not limited to) theistic 
religion”.29 
This is what transpires from different cases concerning religious freedom decided at the ECtHR as 
well as at the CJEU, in which religion is understood as mere individual, voluntary, private, intellectual 
conviction rather than something constitutive of the individual.30 As a matter of fact, in the Achbita 
case, AG Kokott clearly states that “the practice of religion is not so much an unalterable fact as an 
aspect of an individual’s private life, and one, moreover, over which the employees concerned can 
choose to exert an influence […] an employee may be expected to moderate the exercise of his 
religion in the workplace”.31 Thus, based on Kokott’s reasoning, while gender, race, ethnicity and 
other individual characteristics are not chosen, religion is seen as a personal choice: in this way, 
Kokott presupposes an individual able to separate its religious beliefs from their manifestation, its 
internal from its external self. It follows that Ms Achbita ‘chose’ to discriminate herself by choosing 
to manifest her religion. 
However, the essentialization and universalization of the concept of ‘religion’ as something private, 
along with the secular separation between faith and its manifestation, not only ignores the specific 
                                                          
28 Peter Harrison Religion’ and the Religions in the English Enlightenment (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
29 Hirschkind (n. 49) 638. 
30 The essentialization of the concept of religion operated by the ECtHR should not surprise as western and 
human rights law promote abstract reasoning. In fact, the act of categorizing always involves a certain level of 
abstraction from one context to its application into another which results in a high level of uncertainty. Roger 
Trigg. Religion in Public Life: Must Faith Be Privatized?: Must Faith Be Privatized? (OUP Oxford 2007).  
31 Achbita, (n. 1), 213. 
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materialities of different religions, but it also excludes different subjectivities. In fact, for many 
Muslims religion is not a simple private intellectual conviction, but a relationship created through 
practices: Asad notes that the Arabic term Iman (faith) “is not a singular act that one performs naked 
before God. It is the virtue of faithfulness toward God, an unquestioning habit of obedience that God 
requires of those faithful to him, a disposition that has to be cultivated like any other, and which links 
one through mutual responsibility and trust to others who are faithful”.32 Similarly, Mahmood’s study 
of ‘pious women’ highlights that non-liberal traditions have developed different understandings of 
religion and bodily practices: if, on the one hand, secular rationality defines religion (and religious 
signs/practices) as a matter of personal choice, then on the other, ‘pietist women’ disclose a 
performative/affective understanding of (religious) bodily practices.33 She argues that “it is through 
repeated bodily acts that one trains one’s memory, desire, and intellect to behave according to 
established standards of conduct”.34 In fact, for women of the piety movement, repeated bodily acts 
such as praying or wearing the veil become indispensable for acquiring specific values considered 
necessary attributes of the self. In essence, her study reveals that for many Muslim believers Islam is 
not simply a set of commandments based on religious belief, as in western secular thought, but a way 
to live and inhabit the world, bodily and ethically: as their aim is to follow the exemplar of the 
Prophet, a “Muslim’s relationship to Mohammad is predicated not so much upon a communicative or 
representational model as an assimilative one”.35 The Aristotelian term schesis, which is defined as 
the way in which something relates to something else, can capture this sense of pluralistic 
embodiment and inhabitation (or intimacy) which is experienced differently by Muslim believers 
throughout the world: “such an inhabitation of the model (as the term schesis suggests) is the result of 
a labor of love in which one is bound to the authorial figure through a sense of intimacy and desire”.36 
Thus, Muslims’ love for the Prophet is mirrored in their wish to imitate his behaviour and way of life, 
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“not as a commandment but as virtues where one wants to ingest, as it were, the Prophet’s personal 
into oneself”.37 
Based on these studies, it is clear that the ECtHR and the CJEU, by defining religion as a private 
matter, privilege a certain (secular/western) way to live and experience religion at the expense of 
others. The separation made by Article 9 between faith and its manifestation creates not only an 
understanding of how private and public life should be lived and experienced, but also a specific 
imagination which mediates people’s identity in the ‘modern’ world.38 This is the why the ECtHR 
tends to protect forms of religion that are compatible with western/secular/liberal sensitivities while 
excluding others: the women’s headscarf represents a threat to secular sensitivities exactly because it 
proposes an idea of religion that does not conform to western secularity. This is clear in the 
comparison with the Eweida case39 decided at the ECtHR, concerning British Airways’ refusal to 
allow an employee to wear a cross during work time. While Ms Eweida presented her wish to wear 
the cross as a personal choice, rather than a religious requirement, the ECtHR, departing from 
previous juridical decisions concerning the wearing of religious symbols in which the Court stated 
that the manifestation should be one of the “normal and recognized manifestations” of religion or 
belief that “express the belief concerned”,40 established that there was no need for the claimant to 
demonstrate “that she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in question”: in fact, for 
the Court, it was enough to show the existence of a “sufficiently close and direct nexus between the 
act and the underlying belief”.41 In finding a breach of Eweida’s fundamental rights, the Strasbourg 
Court accused the UK of failing to balance Ms Eweida’s individual rights with the right of the 
company to pursue its business and of merely focusing on the possible existence of discrimination in 
the work place. The ECtHR concluded that 
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 “where an individual complains of a restriction on freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than 
holding that the possibility of changing job would negate any interference with the right, the better 
approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not 
the restriction was proportionate”.42 
Conversely, in Achbita and Bougnaoui, the CJEU did not balance the need of the company to 
demonstrate neutrality with the claimants’ fundamental rights. The Court did not even explore 
different ways for companies to maintain a policy of neutrality while mitigating the effects on 
employees’ fundamental rights (for example, by asking them to wear a veil in the company’s colour): 
it merely suggested that companies could offer possible redeployment. While this reasoning sits 
uneasily with the ECtHR’s decision in Eweida, the CJEU seems to align with a previous ECtHR 
decision concerning the wearing of the veil in the case Ebrahimian v France (2015),43 in which a 
social worker was dismissed from a public hospital, in the name of French secular values, because she 
was veiled.44 In the case, the ECtHR noted that the manifestation of ostentatious religious symbols 
was incompatible with the neutrality required of public officials, who should observe and uphold the 
principle of secularism based on Article 1 of the French Constitution. However, while Ms Ebrahimian 
was working in a public institution, Ms Achbita and Ms Bougnaoui were employed in private 
companies that dealt mainly with the private sector. Hence the (supposed) defence of the neutrality of 
the public sphere cannot be employed for private companies, nor can it justify the exclusion of 
Muslim veiled women from the labour market without widening excessively the application of Article 
16. What seems to equate the CJEU and ECtHR decisions is the level of discretion given to member 
states (through the application of the margin of appreciation) and private companies (through the 
importance given to Article 16) over the wearing of the headscarf. This discretion has been made 
possible by a specific definition of religion as a private matter which has blurred, and at the same time 
re-defined, the distinction between public and private, employees’ and employers’ rights. 
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Indeed, while the ECtHR has limited (Muslim) women’s freedom based on the exceptions of Article 9 
(2), the CJEU has banned the veil based on the principle of neutrality, which is not included in Article 
9 (2), except implicitly as a synonym for secularism. In other words, the CJEU has upheld national 
decisions to ban the headscarf in the workplace without balancing the freedom to manifest one’s 
religion and the ‘necessity’ of private companies to give a ‘neutral’ image. ‘Neutrality’, in the case, 
means that companies have the right to limit religious manifestations that are not in line with the 
Christian/secular understanding of religion. In the Lautsi case, Judge Power challenged the ECtHR’s 
understanding of neutrality, stating that “neutrality requires a pluralist approach […] not a secularist 
one. It encourages respect for all world views rather than a preference for one.”45 In view of this, 
‘neutrality’ in the workplace should signify both equal treatment of all customers and the possibility 
of different people to work in the same place. In the case, however, it is clear that the CJEU has 
applied a secular/liberal definition of ‘neutrality’ which depends upon a prior normative 
understanding of what religion is and how the secular/western/liberal subject should experience its 
religious life, presupposing an individual able to separate its internal from its external self. AG 
Kokott’s argument that, unlike sex or ethnicity, religion is a matter of personal choice and can 
therefore be relegated to a small private sphere is an example of the fact that the CJEU has used a 
secular definition of religion. However, by so doing, the ECtHR and the CJEU have not only excluded 
different concepts of religion, but they have also favoured those with no faith and many Christians 
who live and experience religion differently from individuals adhering to other religious creeds. In 
essence, by implying a separation between forum internum and forum externum, the Court has 
marginalized other faiths for whom religious symbols are an integral part of the subject’s formation. 
Thus, the western/secular definition of religion is not a neutral position but, rather, a “normatively 
prescriptive model that favours certain forms of modern religion at the expense of others that are 
equally legitimate”.46 
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What is missed, then, in the analysis of the latest CJEU ruling over the wearing of the headscarf in the 
workplace, is the way in which liberalism and secularism understand and define ‘religion’ and 
‘religious practices’ in the modern world and how this understanding is encoded in the law. In my 
analysis, secularism emerges not merely as the separation between the private and the public, forum 
internum and forum externum, but as the re-configuration of religious sensitivities and religious 
practices in the secular public and private spheres.47 In other words, secularism becomes the 
imposition of a specific form of subjectivity and emerges not only as a “constellation of institutions, 
ideas, and affective orientations that constitute an important dimension of what we call modernity, 
[but also as a] concept that brings together certain behaviours, knowledges, and sensibilities in 
modern life”.48 Thus, secularism, which has become synonymous with ‘modernity’ and ‘neutrality’, 
defines specific forms of knowledge and practices (religious and non-religious) and becomes the 
framework through which to read and understand the religious, political and ethical spheres of the 
Christian/secular/liberal subject.49 
It follows that western and human rights law protects a specific Christian/secular/liberal individual 
whose secular practices and/or sensitivity “is one that depends on, one that cannot be abstracted from, 
the secularist narrative of the progressive replacement of religious error by secular reason – what 
Asad calls the ‘triumphalist narrative of secularism’. A secular sensibility is one considered from the 
standpoint of its contribution to that progressive narrative”.50 In essence, by introducing a secularized 
concept of religion and religious practices, those decisions reveal that western law protects a specific 
Christian/secular/liberal citizen, a gender-neutral homo religious, whose speech and behaviour 
incorporates the western/liberal categories of religious and secular. Hence, in the West, the subject of 
law has the autonomy to express her/his identity only when those identities can be assimilated into 
liberal secular sensitivities. Therefore, although human rights law claims to redeem humanity through 
the force of the law and EU Directive 2000/78 to achieve equality and non-discrimination in the 
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workplace, they actually act to exacerbate cultural and religious differences in the name of a fixed and 
monolithic Christian/secular/liberal law and religious subject and to discriminate against religious 
minorities in Europe. This emerges as a paradox of European secular liberal societies which have 
established a legal framework that should protect the plurality of contemporary western society. 
4. Conclusion 
Religious freedom is considered one of the most important achievements of the secular-liberal polity, 
giving individuals the right to choose a religious belief without any interference from the state, the 
church or other institutions, creating, in this way, a tolerant environment in which personal civil, legal 
and economic rights remain unaffected by one’s religious beliefs.51 However, as is clear from the 
latest CJEU decisions over the wearing of the headscarf in the workplace, by giving a specific 
secular/liberal definition of religion and religious practices, European law operates a differentiation 
between equality grounds as well as religions. This secular/liberal approach taken by the CJEU, as I 
have argued, reveals a particular preoccupation when applied in the interpretation of the Employment 
Equality Directive 2000/78, as it opens the door to a denial of the economic, civil, and legal rights of 
many veiled Muslim women in Europe. 
In the Achbita and Bouganoui cases, the CJEU has adopted Strasbourg’s approach in defining religion 
as covering both the forum internum and forum externum, while, at the same time, it has distinguished 
between the two spheres: while the first is protected, the latter is subject to limitations made by 
Article 9 (2). However, European rulings over the practice of veiling present a certain confusion 
concerning the protection of the forum internum. In particular, it is unclear whether the law protects 
religious beliefs that have been autonomously chosen by the individual, or religious beliefs that are 
un-chosen. 
This confusion is mirrored in the Bougnaoui and Achbita case. In fact, while in Bougnaoui AG 
Sharpston discloses an understanding of religion as something un-chosen, in Achbita religion is 
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understood as mere belief, an idea, a matter of personal choice. In the Bougnaoui case, AG Sharpston 
states that “to someone who is an observant member of a faith, religious identity is an integral part of 
that person’s very being […] it would be entirely wrong to suppose that, whereas one’s sex and skin 
colour accompany one everywhere, somehow one’s religion does not”.52 By contrast, AG Kokott, in 
Achbita, argues that “the practice of religion is not so much an unalterable fact as an aspect of an 
individual’s private life, and one, moreover, over which the employees concerned can choose to exert 
an influence […] an employee may be expected to moderate the exercise of his religion in the 
workplace”.53 Despite this (apparent) divergence, in both cases the AGs link religious liberty to 
individual autonomy, reinforcing the liberal concept of religion as something autonomously chosen by 
the individual. AG Sharpston links autonomy and religious freedom by drawing on AG Maduro in 
Colman54 and defines beliefs as detached from communal rituals and symbologies, reinforcing the 
liberal position taken by diverse scholars who place great emphasis on individual autonomy in the 
establishment of minority religious rights.55 Sharpston’s reasoning seems to recall Kymlicka56 for 
whom the meaning of individual autonomy lies in the individual’s capacity to maintain its cultural 
institutions and way of life: this inevitably expands the range of options between which an individual 
can choose by exercising its autonomy. This reasoning is mirrored also in the Achbita case in which 
the CJEU’s understanding of religious freedom as a means to protect the autonomy of an individual’s 
beliefs inevitably leads to the idea that it is not religion per se, but the ability of the individual to 
‘manifest’ a religious belief in a specific way that is at stake.57 
The task of the Court is therefore not so much to identify what religion is and protect it, but to ensure 
that a specific liberal/secular way of understanding and experiencing religion is protected by Article 9. 
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Hence what is at stake is not merely the distinction between forum internum and forum externum, 
belief and manifestation, but two different concepts of religion: one is linked to individual 
consciousness and autonomy, while the other refers to religion as a discursive tradition which informs 
the collective life of a community. The CJEU’s definition of the forum internum leads to a specific 
concept of how private and collective religious identities are lived and experienced: “thus, even a 
highly individualized and privatized conception of religion (such as Protestantism) entails a 
substantive and prescriptive notion of the self, sociality and collectivity that remains unaccounted for 
the right to religious liberty”.58 Hence, the model of religious tolerance based on the separation 
between the church and the state, the private and the public, which mirrors the model adopted by the 
courts when dealing with ethno-cultural and religious differences,59 reveals an intrinsic contradiction: 
while, on the one hand, European states and private companies do not oppose the freedom of people 
to express their religion, on the other, they are increasingly asking individuals to reduce their freedom 
to a very restricted private sphere; the home and the church. The latest CJEU decisions disclose that 
Article 9 and, more widely, European law protects a specific law and religious subject: an 
autonomous, abstract, gender-neutral individual, a monolithic homo religious, disentangled from its 
gender, ethnicity and social class, who is able to separate its internal from its external being, the forum 
internum from forum externum. 
The CJEU’s definition of religion and the religious subject has important implications when applied 
in the interpretation of Directive 2000/78. Firstly, it presents a problem in the area of equality, 
namely, the equality between religious and non-religious individuals. Dworkin60 and other scholars61 
have pointed out that the principle of religious liberty protects religious beliefs alone, raising issues of 
discrimination between religious and non-religious individuals. Secondly, the CJEU’s individualistic 
approach underpins different concepts of religion and religious practices and, by so doing, leads to the 
exclusion of veiled Muslim women on different grounds. While, based on the exceptions made by 
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article 9 (2), the ECtHR has upheld national decisions to defend the secular character of the state by 
banning the veil from public places/offices, the CJEU has opened the door to a further limitation of 
individual rights in the workplace by encouraging employers to increasingly marginalize different 
religious identities in the name of the principle of neutrality. In the case, however, neutrality has 
signified the exclusion and invisibility of many Muslim women in Europe who already experience 
great discrimination in accessing the labour market. It seems that the CJEU’s judges did not take into 
consideration that Muslim women experience more discrimination than western/Christian/white 
women in the workplace, as revealed by the latest statistics on Islamophobia in Europe. A report 
drafted by the ‘European Network Against Racism’ highlights that Muslim women are less likely than 
white/Christian women to find a job: 44% of employers declared that the wearing of the veil reduces 
the candidate’s chance of getting a job while 50% of those interviewed felt that they had missed the 
chance of getting a proper position because they were veiled.62 The report clearly states that “Muslim 
women face multiple discrimination when searching for employment, in career progression, and in 
gender-based pay equity. This multiple discrimination is a [combination] of gender-based, ethnic, and 
religious factors”.63 Hence, while many politicians such as the French presidential candidate Francois 
Fillon applauded the latest CJEU ruling as “fighting for women's rights and recognition in the 
workplace is an ongoing mission and this ruling should be seen very much as a blow for the 
movement as a whole”,64 it is clear that the CJEU rulings specifically affect veiled Muslim women 
who already face great discrimination in the workplace and also risk exclusion from the labour 
market. 
Thus, the CJEU’s decisions are not neutral, as they disclose an occidental, secular understanding of 
‘religion’ and the religious subject. It is exactly the Christian/secular understanding of religion and the 
religious subject that allows the regulation of private (religious) sentiments in the public sphere to the 
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point that it limits employees’ rights and many Muslim women’s access to and participation in the 
European labour market. In my analysis, it is the lack of problematization of secular forms of power 
that allows the CJEU to introduce restrictions to personal freedoms, perceiving them not as a form of 
violence but as a safeguard of the ‘neutrality’ of private business. 
It follows that the regulation of Muslim women’s performative practices through the application of a 
specific secular/liberal concept of religion and religious practices indicates that secularism does not 
emerge as the mere separation between religion and politics, private and public, but as the re-
configuration of religious sensitivities and religious practices in the secular sphere. Consequently, the 
protection afforded to religious minorities, a principle defined by the secular/Christian codification of 
religion and religious practices, creates the ‘minority problem’ instead of solving it.65 In essence, “the 
liberal (political/constitutional) state does not so much eliminate religion from its operative rationality 
as relocate it from ‘the sphere of public law to that of private law’”.66 Hence, to think about the 
‘religious’ is also to ‘re-think’ about the ‘secular’: “through a certain double movement secularism 
and Christianity have become productively fused, in a way that repeats the story of European 
exceptionality while inscribing the essential otherness of the Muslim populations within its 
borders”.67 
Therefore secular/liberalism, with its promise of political and civil equality, presents an intrinsic 
paradox: on the one hand it claims to free the individual from state intervention in matters of personal 
consciousness, while on the other it regulates the private life of the individual. In fact, if EU law is 
based on equality, democracy and pluralism, the CJEU should consider that religion is not always 
essentially the same and its definition depends on different cultures and historical periods. Although 
what (should) distinguish the liberal/secular project from dictatorial states is its promise of equality 
between citizens, regardless of their affiliation, the latest CJEU decisions show that equality remains a 
far-reaching goal in contemporary Europe: this, in turn, reveals that the secular/liberal polity increases 
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the precarious position of religious minorities as well as the conflict between majority and minority 
views. In fact, as I have argued, while on the one hand western law encodes majoritarian values, on 
the other it promises to be neutral. Hence, while secular/liberal law claims to solve is called upon 
solving a minority-majority conflict, in reality it creates it.68 
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